Decolonizing the spaces of European foreign policy: views from the Maghreb by Dimitrovova, B. & Kramsch, O.T.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/181890
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-04-11 and may be subject to
change.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=riij20
Download by: [Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen] Date: 14 January 2018, At: 03:57
Interventions
International Journal of Postcolonial Studies
ISSN: 1369-801X (Print) 1469-929X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/riij20
DECOLONIZING THE SPACES OF EUROPEAN
FOREIGN POLICY: VIEWS FROM THE MAGHREB
Bohdana Dimitrovova & Olivier Thomas Kramsch
To cite this article: Bohdana Dimitrovova & Olivier Thomas Kramsch (2017) DECOLONIZING THE
SPACES OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: VIEWS FROM THE MAGHREB, Interventions, 19:6,
797-817, DOI: 10.1080/1369801X.2017.1348242
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2017.1348242
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 11 Jul 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 307
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
DECOLONIZ ING THE SPACES OF
EUROPEAN FORE IGN POL ICY : V IEWS
FROM THE MAGHREB
Bohdana Dimitrovovaa and Olivier
Thomas Kramschb
aEberhard Karls Universitat, Germany; bRadboud Universiteit, Netherlands
..................
Decolonization
Economic
development
European
neighbourhood
Programme
Morocco
pensée autre
Postcolonial
horizon
Tunisia
.................
This essay calls for a decolonization of European foreign policy in the
Maghreb. Speciﬁcally, it identiﬁes neo-Orientalizing dynamics within the
EU foreign policy-making apparatus by tracking the contradictory and
fragmenting effects of the European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP) on
the promotion of economic development in Morocco and Tunisia. Drawing
on sustained ﬁeldwork conducted by one of the authors in the aftermath of
the Arab Spring in both these countries, and inspired by a mid-twentieth
century intellectual legacy emerging in and from the Maghreb, the essay
proposes an “other thinking” (pensée autre) capable of reﬁguring the
Europe–Maghreb relation beyond the stalemate offered by ENPI. Such a
rethinking, it is argued, would consider more explicitly the presence of
political Islam as a vector of economic development in ways that restage
the Euro-Maghreb as a postcolonial horizon rather than a ﬁxed border
between self-sufﬁcient geopolitical entities.
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LeMaghreb radicale demeure impensé. (Noureddine, Khatibi, andMeddeb 1977, 5)
Decolonizing European foreign policy
Recent years have witnessed an increase in studies on external perceptions of
the European Union (e.g. Lucarelli 2007; Fioramonti and Poletti 2008; Laidi
2008; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010; Bachmann 2012; Chaban et al. 2013).
While this body of literature has opened insightful pathways for thinking
about EU external relations beyond earlier territorial determinisms and has
undeniably brought valuable insights into the macro-dynamics of EU exter-
nal policy-making, the approach it deploys, in its overall effect, continues
to reinscribe a static, homogeneous and Eurocentric view of that “external”
world to which it is purportedly “relating”. An underlying reason for this
limitation is that research on EU foreign policy has been heavily inﬂuenced
by largely inward-looking EU-speciﬁc approaches (among them integration,
Europeanization or socialization), including concepts of power (e.g. smart,
soft, civilian, transformative or normative power) that have crowded out
an epistemological terrain without adequately addressing the appropriateness
of these indicators for non-western societies (Telò 2001; Smith 2004; Phinne-
more 2009).
More recently, a number of scholars working in the ﬁeld of political geo-
graphies of Europeanization, as well as critical international relations, many
of whom share a long-standing interest in postcolonial theory, have cast
doubt on the usefulness of such Euro-centred concepts (Jones 2006;
Bhambra and Shilliam 2009; Nayak and Selbin 2010). In the main, these lit-
eratures argue that the above-mentioned approaches, while being sourced
originally in western literatures, continue to ignore the vital signiﬁcance of
socio-spatial differences in international relations, particularly when addres-
sing Europe’s current attempts to engage with external territories once con-
stituting its colonial possessions (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Edkins and
Zehfuss 2009). Despite attempts to train attention on non-western views
of Europe, these scholarly movements, we suggest, continue to be plagued
by blinds spots regarding micro-social factors, postcolonial historical lega-
cies and associated political struggles. As Moisio et al. (2012) have observed
in setting an ambitious agenda for mapping external perceptions of the
European Union:
Such articulations, often calling upon an integrated/integrating Europe to play a lead
role in world politics, tend to forget Europe’s imperial history characterized by the
belief that Europe was the “most civilized and best governed of all the world
regions”… and therefore has the right to “teach” its model of political and econ-
omic organization to the rest of the world. (Moisio et al. 2012, 747)
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This claim resonates strongly with that made a decade ago by Hooper and
Kramsch, who, in canvassing lacunae in EU-oriented scholarship, concluded:
The result is a geopolitical analysis which not only precludes recognition of the
spatiotemporal complexities of empire, but masks Europe’s current complicity in
the production of exploitative and oppressive relations within as well as beyond
its newly minted frontiers. (Hooper and Kramsch 2007, 527)
These passages suggest that beyond the obvious need to continue mapping
external perceptions of the EU’s external role and its representations
abroad, it is imperative that we develop perspectives from those very “fron-
tiers” that have historically deﬁned Europe’s imperial contact zones, the
better to identify potential pathways of empowering political transformation
in the renewed articulation of “Europe” and its multiply constitutive outsides.
Rather than serve only to clarify “what the EU ‘is’ – and what it is ‘for’”
(Moisio et al. 2012, 749), thereby recentring Europe as the primary analytical
signiﬁer, we strive for a perspective which, from the very borders of Europe,
produces an orphan knowledge (savoir orphelin) which cannot be tamed as a
form of Europe-centred desire and development. This move would of neces-
sity require that we “return the gaze” upon Europe (Biebuyck and Rumford
2012; Nafafe 2012; Andersen, Kramsch, and Sandberg 2015), but this time
through the lens of a “double critique” (Khatibi 1983), one which not only
problematizes the long-standing Orientalist discourses of the West, but also
unsettles identitarian and religious foundationalisms emerging as counter-
reactions from the global South.
It is against the backdrop of this wider political-cum-epistemological
project that the conceptual contours of our essay are shaped. In so doing,
we are inspired not only by contemporary postcolonial theorizing (Chakra-
barty 2000; Mignolo 2000; Chatterjee 2004; Abrahamsen 2007; Kapoor
2008; Boatca and Costa 2010; Sabaratnam 2011), but draw as well on the
foundations of an older intellectual legacy emerging from the Maghreb in
the mid-to-late-1970s, a tradition deeply concerned with the project of intel-
lectual decolonization in relation to European colonial modernity (Khatibi
1977, 1983; Meddeb 1977; Noureddine, Khatibi, and Meddeb 1977; Buci-
Glucksmann et al. 1987). The urgency and relevance of pursuing research
on EU external relations along these “Maghrebian” lines has been further
underscored by the extraordinary events leading up to the Arab Spring in
2011 and the unspooling of its chaotic, repressive aftermath. These events,
we argue, have had signiﬁcant recursive effects on the production of postco-
lonial theory itself, particularly within critical human geography. Indeed, it
is against the backdrop of a global turn towards militarized and authoritarian
governance that the “subaltern stakes” of postcolonial theory have recently
been questioned tout court, leading some geographers to call attention to
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“forgotten”, regionally speciﬁc postcolonial traditions offering a more
grounded perspective that that offered by the increasingly disconnected
abstractions of the postcolonial canon (Sidaway, Woon, and Jacobs 2014;
see also Brennan 2014). At a moment, then, when the very foundations of
postcolonial theory appear to be shaking, our intervention aims to answer
that call by offering a regionally inﬂected, decolonial perspective on European
foreign policy, attending to the critical perspectives of those on its receiving
end.
In light of this broader agenda, we argue there is a need for a radical para-
digm shift in EU foreign policy, one that would problematize and deconstruct
normative assumptions and well-established preconceptions regarding a
range of so-called European values, values on the basis of which entire
societies located on Europe’s margins are judged and around which preferen-
tial relations with the EU are established. Nowhere is this dynamic on display
more vividly, we aver, than in relation to the EU’s latest foreign policy initiat-
ive, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Our purpose therefore is not
to provide an overview of EU foreign policy in toto, but rather to examine its
economic/development aspects in the Maghreb within the context of its latest
foreign initiative, the ENP. Our understanding of EU foreign policy thus
extends beyond conventional foreign policy analysis, one which would
mainly consider the intergovernmental second pillar of the EU – the
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) – while ignoring its other dimen-
sions (trade or development). In light of our conceptual framework, the differ-
ence between EU foreign policy and external relations is not important, as
they are perceived to be inextricably linked. Whereas EU economic and devel-
opment policies have evolved within the European community framework,
they have also shaped EU foreign policy, and as such represent an important
dimension of the latter.
Against the backdrop of the ENP policy domain, we would like to develop
our argument beyond the circumscribed limits drawn by European studies, in
showing how the EU is reproducing neo-orientalism in its encounter with the
Maghreb. We begin by canvassing a conceptual terrain that contextualizes
modern practices of EU external governance within a longue durée that of
necessity implicates European colonial modalities of othering. In order to
draw out the socio-spatial consequences of these practices for EU–Maghreb
relations more broadly, we begin by exploring Edward Said’s work on the
“geographical imaginations” of European colonial power, an imaginative
practice which had the effect of folding space into difference along an axis
of graduated inferiority. We then address contemporaneous critiques of the
Saidian framework, and propose that in order to grasp the stakes of
Europe’s contemporary relationship with the Maghreb we must draw on a
body of thinking from the Maghreb that attempts to work beyond the b/
ordered Orientalizing categories of Us–Them, East–West and Occident–
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Orient which lay at the heart of the Saidian analytical enterprise. Inspired by
the work of Moroccan sociologist/poet Abdelkebir Khatibi, we explore the
possibilities inherent in a “double critique” (pensée autre) that serves to
deconstruct categories emerging from both shores of the Mediterranean. On
this view, the articulation of Europe and the Maghreb, we suggest, appears
not so much as a reﬂection that clariﬁes the nature of a preexisting geopolitical
entity (whether it be “Occident” or “Orient”, “Europe” or the “Maghreb”),
but as a dynamic postcolonial horizon that reawakens on Europe’s southern
frontier the promise of a “spatial turn” thus far held in abeyance both in criti-
cal border studies and Europeanization studies broadly (Khatibi 1977; Lois
2014; Andersen, Kramsch, and Sandberg 2015).
In order to illuminate the workings of our conceptual framework, we
draw on extensive empirical ﬁeldwork carried out in Morocco and
Tunisia1 by one of the authors prior to and after the Arab Spring. Such ﬁeld-
work encompassed approximately sixty interviews, including a diversity of
governmental ofﬁcials as well as civil society groups, including political and
economic grassroots activists, religious leaders, NGOs and social move-
ments, as well as daily observations. Most interviews were conducted in
French, with the exception of Islamic/Islamist informants, who preferred
to speak Arabic. The main aim of open-ended interviews was to map the per-
ceptions, attitudes and contestations of Maghrebi elites towards EU/western
socioeconomic policies in the region. Due to the aggravated security situ-
ation in Tunisia after the Arab Spring, the author had limited access to Isla-
mist informants, who were either under surveillance by the state security
apparatus or who no longer trusted any foreign researcher. Fieldwork in
Tunisia was inﬂuenced by a series of political events, frequent arrests as
well as a deep and emerging divide between secular and religious segments
of Tunisian society. This situation resulted in an uneven harvest of data
from Morocco and Tunisia, perhaps offering the impression of unequal
and selective treatment of available empirical evidence. Rather, we believe
the available ﬁeldwork material adequately illuminates the problems, con-
tradictions and aporias of European silencing practices in the Maghreb, as
revealed in our theoretical framework.
To illustrate our argument, we examine a contested area in which the EU
has sought inﬂuence in shaping internal societal dynamics across the
Maghreb: socioeconomic development. Our ﬁndings will be used not only
to pose the problem of EU neo-orientalizing practices vis-à-vis Morocco
and Tunisia, but also more vitally to clear a new space for thinking the EU–
Maghreb relation from the perspective of a “difference” that cannot be recup-
erated or tamed. It is in revealing the recalcitrant spatiality of that différence
intraitable or difference sauvage (Khatibi 1983, 39) between Europe and the
Maghreb that we seal our closing arguments.
1 Bohdana
Dimitrovova
conducted a ﬁrst
round of interviews in
Morocco (= 50)
between March and
June 2010 and again
in April 2013.
Interviews in Tunisia
were conducted in
March 2014.
Interviews focused on
civil society
organizations,
political activists,
journalists,
academics,
government ofﬁcials,
parliamentary
deputies and staff at
EU embassies, as well
as the EU delegation.
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Disorienting orientalism
Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing
with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views
of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short, Orientalism as
a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the
Orient. (Said 1978, 8)
Et nous sommes toujours en train de nous demander: de quel Occident s’agit-il? De
quel Occident opposé a nous-meme, en nous-memes? Qui, nous-memes, dans la
décolonisation? (Khatibi 1983, 14)
As revealed in the ﬁrst quotation above, Edward Said’s concept of Orient-
alism was developed to denote the entire historical range of discursive prac-
tices emanating from Europe on/about that region historically constituted
as “the Orient” (Said 1978). Through its mobilization of orientalist “ima-
ginative geographies”, Europe would be in a position to render the Orient
exotic, strange and mysterious, and thus ripe for conquest by rational, ben-
eﬁcent and disinterested colonial powers. In this way, colonial power/
knowledge would manage to fold space into difference along a spatiotem-
poral axis with Europe placed at its apex (Gregory 1995). Space limitations
foreclose a lengthy treatment of the myriad critiques spawned in the wake
of Said’s magnum opus, Orientalism (1978), including his supposedly
insufﬁcient treatment of political economy and class relations under colo-
nialism (Ahmad 1992; Dirlik 1994, 1996), or the contradictions engen-
dered by his privileged location within the very western academy he
criticized. For our purposes we focus on the most substantial critique of
Said’s oeuvre, one which centres on his totalizing, homogenizing and cul-
turalist modes of analysis, which in the words of James Clifford (1980)
“sometimes appears to mimic the essentialising discourse it attacks”. It
has been repeatedly argued that Said falls into the trap of reproducing
the same discourse he is criticizing while inverting the existing hierarchies
of knowledge (Richardson 1990). Said did later recognize his tendency to
portray Orientalism as a unifying and monolithic concept, while insisting
on the reciprocal relationship between colonial knowledge and colonial
power (Said 1993).
Signiﬁcantly, by exposing the essentialist character of power/knowledge
production under imperial conditions and by dichotomizing the relationship
between oppressed and oppressor, Said would be taken to task for under-
playing the myriad ways in which “the West” would be internalized by
those non-western peoples on the receiving end of colonialism, as reﬂected
in the second epigraph to this section. On this, Stuart Hall wrote
powerfully:
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Not only, in Said’s “Orientalist” sense, were we constructed as different and other
within the categories of knowledge of the West by those regimes. They had the
power to make us see and experience ourselves as “Other”. (Hall 1990, 225)
Hall’s Caribbean sensitivity to theMoebius-like psycho-spatialities of colonial
power brings us very close to the sensibilities of the Moroccan sociologist,
novelist and poet Abdelkebir Khatibi. At the beginning of his magisterial
Maghreb pluriel (1983), Khatibi writes:
If, therefore, Occident inhabits our most intimate self, not as an absolute and devas-
tating exteriority, nor as an eternal domination, but as a difference, a conglomerate
of differences to be posed as such in all thinking about difference from whatever its
source; if, then, Occident (thus named, thus located) is not a response to an incalcul-
able exile, then all remains to be thought: silent questions that suffer in us… (Khatibi
1983, 12; translated from French by authors)
Si donc l’Occident habite notre etre intime, non point comme une exteriorité absolue
et dévastatrice, ni comme une maitrise eternelle, mais bel et bien comme une differ-
ence, un conglomerate de differences a poser en tant que tel dans toute pensée de la
difference de d’ou qu’elle vienne; si donc l’Occident (ainsi nommé, ainsi situé) n’est
pas la reaction a un déssaroi incalculé, alors tout reste a penser: questions silen-
cieuses qui souffrent en nous…
Khatibi’s answer to the depressions and humiliations wrought by colonial-
ism’s rule is in the form of what he terms a “double critique” (pensée
autre), which signals a form of thinking that “disorients” the Saidian Orien-
talist vision:
Let us engage with what is presented before us and let us attempt to transform it
according to a double critique, that of this western heritage and that of our own
patrimony, so theological, so charismatic, so patriarchal. A double critique: we
believe only in the revelation of the visible, the end of all celestial theology and of
all fatal nostalgia. (Khatibi 1983, 12; translated from French by authors)
Engageons-nous d’emblée dans ce qui est réalisé devant nous et essayons de le trans-
former selon une double critique, celle de cet héritage occidental et celle de notre
patrimoine, si théologique, si charismatique, si patriarcal. Double critique: nous
ne croyons qu’a la revelation du visible, ﬁn de toute théologie celeste et de toute nos-
talgie mortiﬁante.
Through such a double critique – both of western metaphysics and Arab
Islamic fundamentalist tradition – Khatibi restages the Maghreb as a
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horizon for thought (“comme horizon de pensée”), as a geo-philosophical site
capable of taking part in global affairs on its own terms:
We would need to think the Maghreb as it is, a topographic site between the Orient,
the West and Africa, in such a way that it may world on its own terms. (Khatibi
1983, 38–39; translated from French by authors)2
Il faudrait penser le Maghreb tel qu’il est, site topographique entre l’Orient, l’Occi-
dent et l’Afrique, et tel qu’il puisse se mondialiser pour son propre compte.
Maghreb-as-horizon, for Khatibi, is that of an “awakened margin” (“une
marge en éveil”) (17), a space of untamed difference (“différence intraitable”)
and plural thinking (“pensée pluriel”) whose historical determinations can
never be returned to any ontological foundations of Being rooted either in
western metaphysics or Islamic theocratic traditionalism (“du non-retour a
l’inertie des fondements de notre etre”) (12).3
Khatibi, of course, would not be alone in staging the Maghreb as a site
of worldly plurality. Writing just a decade after Maghreb pluriel, Algerian-
born Réda Bensmaia channels the work of the Algerian poet Nabile Fares
so as to speak from an “edge, in a margin or marginality where borderline
phenomena ‘open up’ the Mediterranean rather than delineate its closure”
(Bensmaia and Curtiss Gage 1993, 45). Bensmaia positions Fares’ work
within his generation’s collective project of overcoming the “cultural void
and blindness” of the postcolonial Algerian state, one which attempts to
reduce Algeria to one race, one language, one faith, thus denying the rich
and heterogeneous ethnic, religious and linguistic heritage which makes
up its “reality”.
Rather than afﬁrm Kabyle identity as an indissolubly minoritarian differ-
ence, counterposed to a majoritarian state, Bensmaia supports Fares’
attempt to craft a “third” position, a “middle ground, the grey areas
between these poles” (1993, 53). For Bensmaia, this space is constituted by
“the Neutral”. The Neutral represents a “position that calls into question
the forces that lockMaster and Slave into a ﬁght to the death”. It is also a pos-
ition that keeps a certain “distance” from everything that tends to characterize
protagonists rigidly and deﬁnitively as “adversaries or predetermined subjects
in opposition: Algerian vs. Kabyle, European vs. Oriental, man vs. woman,
Self vs. Other” (53; for use of le neutre in an Amazonian setting, see
Kramsch 2012). In dialogue with Deleuze, but more signiﬁcantly forming a
bloc d’alliance with other minoritarian movements – black Americans, Sah-
raouis, opponents of Franco, Algerian émigrés, Palestinians – Bensmaia,
like Khatibi before him, argues for “the simultaneity of a double movement”
(1993, 63), one which allows him to escape both the majoritarian pressures of
his own ethnic community (Kabyle as well as that of the majoritarian Algerian
2 As if to nail home
the point, Khatibi
adds:
qui, parmi-nous –
groups et individus
– a pris en charge le
travail effective-
ment décolonisa-
teur dans sa portée
globale et décon-
stitutive de l’image
que nous nous
faisons de notre
domination,
exogene et endo-
gene? Nous
sommes encore a
l’aube de la pensée
mondiale. (1983,
16; emphasis
added)
More than three
decades on from
when this sentence
was written, we still
remain at the dawn of
this kind of thinking.
The double critique
attempted here of
EU–Morocco
relations is our
attempt to “take
charge” of the legacy
of Khatibi’s grand
and generous gesture,
albeit in a radically
transformed geo-his-
torical context, for
the Maghreb, and the
world.
3 Drawing on the
work of Tahar Ben
Jelloun, Jacques
Derrida and Boualem
Sansal, the Utrecht-
based scholars Birgit
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state). Bensmaia names the resulting identity “becoming minoritarian” of the
Algerian subject, one which has as end goal “separating Algeria – and the
entire Maghreb – from its ‘major identity’, which for him is but a ‘borrowed
identity’, a treacherous fabrication…which does harm to Algeria and the
Maghreb” (1993, 61).
By contrast, Bensmaia and Fares’ vision of the Maghreb–Mediterranean is
no longer one of majoritarian states and subjects, but as a “boundary/liminal
phenomenon”, a lived space considered as a “zone of intense proximity or co-
presence” (Bensmaia and Curtiss Gage 1993, 69). Their Mediterranean is one
of “circulation, passage, not from one culture or country to another, but from
one margin to another, from border to border, edge to edge: never ‘in’, but
always ‘in between’” (69). At this point, we are far, indeed, from Saidian
essentialisms of the sort expressed in the idiom of Us–Them or West–
Orient. We now enter a twilight desert space, one which, like the horizon of
a receding mirage, challenges us to recast the speciﬁc “reality” of the Euro-
Maghreb relation today on the basis of a rejuvenated bloc d’alliance with
the wider world.
Desert thinking
Indeed, Khatibi’s thought horizon, it’s very “face” (“le visage de la pensée,
en retrait, se met a regarder l’autre en lui meme éloigné”), involves a form
of “desert thinking” (“la pensée de l’etre et du desert”) (1983, 23), one
which ﬁnds its spatial resolution at the meeting point of three major “trans-
formations” seen to be at work in the Maghreb. The ﬁrst axis, labelled Tra-
dition (traditionalisme), refers to metaphysics reduced to theology (“la
métaphysique réduite a la theologie”). Here, Khatibi identiﬁes a form of
theological thinking rooted in an embrace of One and Being as primal
cause, both of God and the world (25). A second major transformative
axis is located by Khatibi in what he calls Salaﬁsm (salaﬁsme). Here, the
Moroccan essayist designates a metaphysics turned doctrine (“la métaphy-
sique devenue doctrine”): a morals, a political habitus, a social pedagogy, a
reconciliation of science and religion, of techne and theology (25). Finally, a
third axis of change is constituted by what Khatibi calls Rationalism (ratio-
nalisme), which is deﬁned as metaphysics gone technical (“la métaphysique
devenue technique”). In dialogue with Heidegger, Khatibi here names an
ordering of the world (“mise en ordre du monde”) according to an as-
yet unsurpassed will to power which draws its force from scientiﬁc
development.
Rather than address these three transformative axes “psycho-ideologi-
cally”, Khatibi posits that the speciﬁc articulation of traditionalism, salaﬁsm
Kaiser and Kathrin
Thiele have recently
recuperated the idea
of “the possible
horizon of an other of
the heading” for
Europe (2016, 273),
one which resonates
strongly alongside
Khatibi’s notion of
the Maghreb as a
“thought horizon”.
In both instances
what is yearned for is
“another ‘logic’ …
that departs from
(this or that)
direction, without
falling for yet
(merely) another
heading” (Kaiser and
Thiele 2016, 273). In
this double
movement, perhaps
we are now
witnessing for the
ﬁrst time an
intellectual framing
of the Mediterranean
as a postcolonial
horizon from either
side of its shores,
whose vanishing
point remains the site
for a future-oriented
politics.
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and rationalism should be embedded within a wider analysis of “structural
solidarities” (solidarités structurelles) which must be taken into account
when considering the Arab world in its entirety (“le monde arabe dans sa glo-
balité”) (25). At stake for Khatibi is not just a descriptive empiricism of the
Arab world, but its “historical destiny” (destin historial), a destiny which of
necessity implicates the expansion and decline of Arab countries, including
the gap (chiasme) which connects Arabs to the world beyond (“occidental
ou autre”) (26).
If we are to “take charge” of the Saidian, Khatibian and Bensmaian concep-
tual legacies in making sense of the Maghreb today, we must update and
adjust it to the current geopolitical and geo-economic setting. This is meant
to question neither the signiﬁcance of Said’s notion of Orientalism nor
Khatibi and Bensmaia’s dialogical critique, but to provide a fresh set of coor-
dinates for the Euro-Maghreb relation, the better to grasp the changed geo-
historical circumstances within which the three transformative axes of Khati-
bi’s critique meet and interlace within the current conjunctures of the
Maghreb. This task, we believe, would do honour to Khatibi’s call to listen
to the Maghreb in its plurality (“écouter le Maghreb résonner dans sa plura-
lité”) (1983, 39), while rethinking it “otherwise” and from its “outside”
(“dans l’ébranlement de n’importe quell au-dela et quelle que soit la determi-
nation de cet au-dela”) (14).
“La pensée du desert”: if this form of thinking from a reawakened
marge still has meaning half a decade after Khatibi’s death, we believe
such thought can take place most productively by centring our analysis
on the transformed conditions for postcolonial agency in the contemporary
Maghreb (Dabashi 2009). Indeed, as we think and write from a European
heartland but through a reformulated alliance with the Maghreb, we join
up with Étienne Balibar’s recent call to think “Europe at the limits”
(2016), and in so doing crossing that disciplinary threshold within postco-
lonial studies that has heretofore bifurcated it between the effects of deco-
lonization on European metropoles, on the one hand, and on formerly
colonized societies on the other. At that very moment where postcolonial
studies “is paradoxically dissolving or being altered before it had been
entirely mapped and acknowledged”, Balibar argues, it is time to recognize
that in a time of economic austerity and rising xenophobia within Europe
and bloody wars raging without, the outer border of Europe “has
migrated… from the African deserts to the middle of Europe” (Balibar
2016, 168).
Thinking through the “postcolonial entanglements” (Ponzanesi 2016) of
suffering, agency and resistance linking Europe and the Maghreb today, we
argue, requires engaging with a novel, deterritorialized and multifaceted
form of neo-Orientalism which ﬁnds expression in an evolving process of
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modernization (or “Europeanization”), one which we suggest lies at the heart
of EU foreign policy-making.4
The re-orientalization of EU–Maghreb relations
Current EU–Maghreb relations are governed by the ENP, a foreign policy
initiative which, in the memorable words of the then-EU Commissioner
Romano Prodi, set out to create a “ring of friends” around the European
Union, creating a sphere of security and prosperity that would diminish the
risk of creating new dividing lines between the EU and its new-found “neigh-
bours” (European Commission 2003).5 In setting guidelines for ENP “part-
nership”, potential candidate countries are offered “everything but the
institutions” under principles of conditionality outlined in the “Copenhagen
criteria”. “More for more” is an incentive-based approach: those who go
further and faster with reforms are promised greater EU support (European
Commission 2011, 5). The ENP thus provides a framework of possibilities
and obligations which are in turn negotiated and speciﬁed in bilateral Associ-
ation Agreements (AA) between the EU and individual ENP countries. A list
of priorities is speciﬁed in the ENP Action Plans, and its implementation is
closely monitored and evaluated in the progress reports which are annually
issued by the European Commission.
Within this novel geopolitical frame, the image of Occident and Orient
initially proffered by Said and Khatibi needs to be revised and adjusted to
the contemporary processes of EU-sponsored othering (or re-bordering),
one which entails a nuanced neo-orientalizing terminology constructed
largely out of technical and managerial “empty signiﬁers” denoting ideal-
type values, terms which the EU arrogates unto itself with the force of a mon-
opoly (“democracy”, “good governance”, “human rights”, “rule of law”,
“liberal market”). The much celebrated and praised adoption of putatively
technical and value-free European norms and values often promulgated
within European studies (best expressed through the notion “Normative
Power Europe”) is not politically innocent, however. Firstly, mobilization
of these terms as well as material resources allows EU foreign policy ofﬁcials
to assess and rank ENP countries along a continuum of progress deﬁned by
categories such as efﬁcient–inefﬁcient, organized–corrupted and demo-
cratic–autocratic. It is precisely here that we can illuminate the neo-colonizing
logic of the ENP, according to which the Maghreb is categorized in terms of
progress, development and performance. Echoing imperial geopolitics, the EU
conﬁrms its privileged status through its benchmarking and evaluative mech-
anisms, including rewards and punishments, depending on an individual
country’s compliance with European regulations and norms, as well as its geo-
political importance for the EU and its allies in the Maghreb.
4 As eloquently
mapped by Hansen
and Jonsson (2014),
the fascinating yet
largely “hidden”
genealogy of the EU’s
postcolonial
entanglement with
the Maghreb, as well
as the wider Arab
world, reaches back
as far as the moment
of its institutional
foundation as an
integrated
community of states.
5 The countries that
make up Europe’s
new-found
“neighbourhood” are
Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Palestine,
Lebanon, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Ukraine and
Moldova.
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Secondly, the EU shapes the discursive strategies of domestic actors and
their perceptions of what is permissible and acceptable by the West. It is in
this sense that Morocco and Tunisia can be understood as postcolonial hor-
izons of a European project of modernity, in which the EU extends a form
of western reason (Khatibi’s rationalisme), a technical metaphysics whose
will to power expands its inﬂuence, while ordering contiguous worlds
(Khatibi 1983, 25). Through its normative power narratives, the ENP
encodes an “epistemic and ontological violence”, one which in the
Maghreb produces a range of “silent questions” (questions silencieuses)
(Khatibi 1983) that have the potential to erupt into the open when they
fester long enough, as is the case with political Islam (see the next section
on Islamic economic development).
We have argued elsewhere that through the ENP the EU seeks to homogen-
ize and codify its neighbours into self-managed neighbouring units (Dimitro-
vova 2010; Kramsch 2011). The normative discourse of the EU provides
opportunities for the proponents of ENP to further enhance their universaliz-
ing mission. As such, Khatibi’s notion of Maghreb-as-horizon, as a postcolo-
nial space of contending metaphysical systems – in this case the universalizing
“rationalism” and “will to power” of EU bureaucratic norms and their
ambivalent encounter with the “traditions” of political Islam – can be
useful for understanding why Arab societies may at one time consider
ENP’s norms as objects of admiration, while at other times Islamists and
radical Left groups may critically or uncritically engage with their pasts to
recover their (post)colonial agency and possibilities for resistance. The
desert encounter between Khatibian traditionalisme and rationalisme, we
believe, is supremely staged over the vital issues surrounding socioeconomic
development in the Maghreb.
Decolonizing economic development
After more than a decade of EU-sponsored efforts at fostering socioeconomic
development in its Maghreb neighbourhood, the desired results remain
elusive: there is soaring unemployment, limited access to basic services,
growing social inequalities and persisting illiteracy and poverty. The EU’s
agenda of socioeconomic reforms is premised on a particular view of rational
economic behaviour characterized by self-disciplined, entrepreneurial and
competitive calculation guided by neoliberal principles of effectiveness, pro-
ductivity and proﬁt-making. In cooperation with other powerful proponents
of neoliberal reforms (the IMF and the World Bank), the EU – through its
ﬁnancial packages, trainings and twinning programmes, as well as more
subtle forms of assistance – has actively supported regional governmental
interventions – 19:6 808............................
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and non-governmental elites upon which a certain epistemic rationality has
been applied and tested. Despite these attempts, however, the EU has not
managed fully to transform the Maghreb’s home economicus according to
its neoliberal visions and expectations. Lacking social and material foun-
dations, the EU’s top-down approach to socioeconomic development has
further alienated the average Moroccan or Tunisian, who has gained very
little from EU-directed reforms.
Signiﬁcantly, the failure of EU development policies is attributed by the EU
and the wider international community to the corruption, bad governance, cli-
entelism and/or the lack of social capital of ArabMuslims. This powerful nar-
rative has in turn been appropriated by different western actors (EU
institutions, civil society organizations, media and western academics),
including regional elites located within domestic Arab societies. Considering
that the EU is one of the main protagonists of neoliberal reforms in the
Maghreb, its role as external observer and judge is problematic because it
shunts aside its own responsibility when things go wrong (Mitchell 1991).
The purpose here is not to blame the West entirely, but rather to highlight
its inextricably entangled complicity in the reform process (Ponzanesi 2016).
As a result of this complicity, we argue we are now observing in the
Maghreb a hybridization and pluralization of socioeconomic space located
at the interface of competing metaphysical systems – in this case the universa-
lizing “rationalism” and “will to power” of EU bureaucratic norms on the one
hand, and their ambivalent encounter with the “traditions” of political Islam
and what remains of the radical Left, on the other hand. In what follows, we
focus our analysis on two reemerging paradigms – political Islam6 and the
radical Left – each of which, in different ways, has sought to transform socio-
economic space in the Maghreb by contesting the EU’s monopoly over the
development of Maghreb societies. In so doing, we are aware of the limit-
ations in fully addressing the complexity and heterogeneity of these move-
ments which, despite their common objectives of social justice and human
dignity, their shared experience of severe repression and more importantly
their anti-capitalist stance, have not transcended their ideological differences,
notably the role of religion or atheism in Maghreb daily life.
Here again, we observe that the EU has been complicit in sustaining and
reproducing divisions between secular and Islamic forces by discursively
and ﬁnancially favouring the former over the latter. In effect, the EU’s
roadmap for socioeconomic development has been problematized mainly by
Islamists and the Left, albeit for different ideological reasons. In both
Morocco and Tunisia, their criticisms were directed against unconditional
economic liberalization with few obligations and regulations for foreign
investors. The representatives of the main Islamic political parties – the PJD
in Morocco and Tunisia’s Ennahda – were in general more in favour of priva-
tization and foreign investment than the Left. Yet unlike other proponents of
6 In 2009, 2010 and
2013 Dimitrovova
interviewed several
deputies of the Party
for Justice and
Development (PJD),
as well as senior
members of
unrecognized Islamist
movements: the
Association of Justice
and Charity (ADW),
Badil Hadari
(Alternative
Civilization) and
Umma (Nation). In
2014 she interviewed
members of the
Tunisian Islamic
party Ennahda, as
well as inﬂuential
Salaﬁsts.
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neoliberalism, their support for privatization and foreign investment has been
limited to certain sectors and conditioned by principles which at ﬁrst glance
align with Left-oriented groups.
For Islamists, more equitable development is rooted ﬁrst and foremost in
the recovery of moral values and Islamic principles. Social justice, human
dignity and social solidarity are also central to the Islamic paradigm of devel-
opment. For Islamists, however, the goal of economic development is to
encourage private property and nourish the creation and accumulation of
wealth, while respecting and defending private ownership if obligations to
other members of society are respected through payment of zakat. In this
sense Islam is highly favourable to commerce, private property and the free
market if Islamic principles and values are upheld in practice. The underlying
idea is that Islam should counteract the negative consequences of the free
market, expressed by heightened levels of alienation, greed, selﬁshness and
family decomposition. The Left, however, distances itself from the moral cri-
tique of capitalism (as espoused mainly by Salaﬁsts), as well as its emphasis on
spirituality.
Islamists are primarily concerned with the destructive effects of western
modernization/economic liberalization on Muslim societies, exempliﬁed
through excessive consumerism, the decomposition of family life and deca-
dent individualism. Islamist criticism does not aim at rejecting modernity
itself, but rather seeks accommodation through the recovery and preservation
of Islamic values (solidarity, modesty, family) and Islamic principles. As
explained by a senior member of Morocco’s largest Islamic Association of
Justice and Charity (ADW):
It is not a matter of going back in time and rejecting all that comes from the West.
This is an image produced by the West and reproduced by the monarchy to demo-
nize us as an anti-progressive, irrational, backward force. What we reject is the
western monopoly over development in Morocco, to decide for us how and when
we should reform. (Author interview, April 2013, Morocco)
Drawing mainly on Marxist and Leninist doctrines, the primary concerns of
the radical Left in Morocco and Tunisia are class struggle, continued exploi-
tation by capitalist elites, economic reliance on a low-paid Moroccan labour
force, indecent working conditions, the abuse of human rights (including the
right to work) and the exploitative practices of multinational corporations.
General criticism is directed against Morocco’s unconditional integration
into the global liberal economy. In this respect, the opening of the Moroccan
economy with few obligations and regulations for foreign investments is per-
ceived by the Moroccan Left to bring short-term beneﬁts for some, while
having an overall negative effect on socioeconomic development. When grass-
roots organizations such as labour unions or associations of unemployed
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students resort to methods outside democratic procedures (such as hunger
strikes) they are accused of demagogy and irrationality by pro-reform groups.
Given the foregoing, the right to work has frequently been mentioned as
one of the main demands of leftist movements in both countries, and has
become the main slogan of the Arab Spring. Islamists have stressed not only
the right to work but also an obligation to work for the Muslim community,
which does not intervene or contradict the duty to pray or spend time with
family. This is an important observation to bear in mind, otherwise the
right to work can easily be deprived of its original essence and emphasis on
self-fulﬁlment, creativity and human dignity. As pointed out by one partici-
pant of daily sit-in protests organized by the Association for Unemployed
Graduates in Morocco (AUGM), “we are demanding a right for decent
work. We are protesting against indecent working conditions, inadequate
wages and one day employments” (interviews with protestors in Rabat,
Morocco, June 2013).
According to the AUGM, in the absence of labour regulations that protect
workers’ rights, the EU should reconsider its strategy that the private sector
will provide new job opportunities if, in the end, these measures result in
greater employment insecurity, inadequate wages for sustaining basic living
standards and poorer working conditions (European Commission 2011, 7).
For instance, AUGM members argue that in many cases foreign investors as
well as domestic private-sector companies do not respect the basic labour
regulations stipulated by the International Labour Organization,7 something
which would be unacceptable in EU member states. If the EU continues
blindly to promote investment without considering the double labour stan-
dards of European investors, it becomes indirectly complicit in accepting
such abusive practices/double standards, thus providing a unifying rallying
point for both Islamic and radical Left movements, while opening a space
for each group to radicalize their respective positions, both domestically vis-
à-vis one another, as well as globally in relation to the EU.
The production of an increasingly hybridized and pluralized space of socio-
economic development in Morocco and Tunisia can be most vividly observed
in the contested arena of Islamic ﬁnancial reform. On this front, newly elected
Islamist governments in both countries have recently proposed two products:
Islamic banking, which prohibits the setting of interest rates, and the forma-
lization of zakat,8 the only tax permitted by the Qur’an. Both provisions
are considered to be a cornerstone of the Islamic economy, where individuals
are guided in their economic decisions by a set of behavioural norms derived
from the Qura’an. According toMorocco’s Party of Justice and Development,
zakat could help ﬁnance social services in the ﬁelds of education, health and
poverty if it was collected and supervised by an independent institution.9
This view was shared not only by Islamists but also by those who pay zakat
out of personal conviction. In the view of the PJD, if zakat were collected
7 Both Morocco and
Tunisia joined the
ILO in 1956.
8 Zakat is identiﬁed
as providing the basis
for achieving social
solidarity and social
welfare in Islamic
countries and should
not replace the
secular tax of the
modern state.
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and supervised by a central institution it could be used to support social
welfare in Morocco. With the introduction of the tax system by the modern
Arab state, zakat has become a voluntary charity, although differences of
opinion exist among Islamic scholars as to what degree this is a voluntary
act or an obligation for Muslims (Bonner 2005). The question of the volun-
tary nature of zakat and the conditions under which such contributions
should be made are important because they relate to the broader Islamic con-
ceptualization of poverty, social justice and progress, all of which are deﬁned
by moral criteria that cannot be easily accommodated to the norms of a
western, neo-classically deﬁned market economy.
The question of Islamic banking has triggered numerous controversies and
debates across the political spectrum of Moroccan society. On the one hand
there are those who refer to the Islamic prohibition on the setting of interest
rates or proﬁt-making (riba), while pointing to the instability of a western/
modern banking system based on speculation and proﬁt-making (a point
raised by both the radical Left and Islamists). Others, such as economic
elites and the monarchy, consider any changes to the banking system as a
threat to their power. The Moroccan Central Bank has banned using the
term “Islamic banking”, referring instead to “development banking” or the
use of “alternative products”, while avoiding any Islamic references which
could distinguish between legal (Haram) and illicit (Halal) practices. As an
indication of the political sensitivities involved, Islamic Sharia scholars who
could familiarize Moroccan citizens with the concept of Islamic banking
were not allowed to intervene in debates organized by the monarchy
around Islamic banking products (Boudad 2012).
Both zakat and Islamic banking are viewed by the EU and Moroccan
secular actors (i.e. domestic elites and the radical Left) as utopian, irrational
and in tension with the private lives of citizens. Whereas the EU’s economic
developmental model is taken for granted and assumed as universal, any
“alternative” propositions need to be supported by clearly measurable and
quantiﬁable data, as evidenced by neoclassical economic indicators such as
self-interested, maximizing behaviour, market equilibrium and individual pre-
ferences (Zein-Elabdin and Charusheela 2004). Lacking these preconditions,
both zakat and Islamic banking initiatives are ignored or (in the worst case)
silenced by western-based ofﬁcials who claim to have economic authority.
Neither Islamic banking nor zakat are mentioned in any ENP document,
including the EU–Morocco Action Plan. They were rarely discussed in the
Brussels-based interviews conducted for this essay. EU ofﬁcials who were
aware of such proposals quickly dismissed them on the grounds of their “reli-
gious”, and therefore “archaic”, nature.10
In sum, the authors encountered mistrust in the corner ofﬁces of the Euro-
pean Commission towards non-proﬁt and non-market forms of Islamic
banking and zakat, as well as their perceived instrumentalization by Islamists.
9 Author interview
with a high-ranking
ofﬁcial from the PJD,
April 2013,
Morocco.
10 Author interviews
with ofﬁcials at
DGDevco and
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In this context, the EU considers itself best equipped to provide “free” advice
because of its self-representation as a rational and neutral actor, including its
capacity efﬁciently to rationalize, standardize and produce quick technical
ﬁxes. As a consequence of the stigmatization of Islamic banking and zakat,
the Moroccan PJD (as well as Umma and ADW) have revised their discursive
strategies to mitigate the potentially negative consequences of using such
terms. Whereas in 2009 representatives of the PJD spoke openly about
Islamic banking, Islamic legislation and other Islamic principles, these con-
cepts have been replaced by the more innocuous sounding “development
banking”. In the same vein, zakat is often compared to a more secular tax
on capital. To reiterate: our intention is not to suggest that Islam rejects capit-
alism tout court, but rather to show that other developmental paradigms are
emerging within the Maghreb that contest the West’s monopoly on the term
“market economy”. Many scholars, including members of the Moroccan Isla-
mist political class, characterize Islam as highly favourable to commerce, the
circulation of goods and the encouragement of private property (Tripp 2006).
At stake in the semantic struggles over economic development in Morocco,
we argue, is the delineation of a spatial horizon of postcolonial difference
between the EU and the Maghreb. This postcolonial “difference”, however,
is “untamed” (intraitable) due to its thoroughly processual nature; it does
not claim an a priori “essence”, emerging as it does in a fully dialogic relation
with ENP assessment criteria – “good governance”, “liberal market
economy”, “human rights”, “rule of law” – themselves “empty signiﬁers”
and strategically devoid of substance. Thus, local struggles over the proper
spatiotemporal conditions for the use of zakat can be read as a move on the
part of progressive Moroccan Islamists both to counter the EU–ENP’s mon-
opoly on the term “market economy”, while simultaneously opening a
space for development that avoids either the secular critique of the radical
Left or the rigidity of backward-looking, traditionalist (i.e. Salaﬁst) dogma.
The EU–ENP would do well to pay greater heed to debates over the proper
role of zakat and Islamic banking in Moroccan society, as this constitutes not
just a local Moroccan, or even “Muslim” issue, but a strategic space of enor-
mous signiﬁcance in the contemporary rearticulation of developmental
relations between Europe and the Maghreb. In spite of the EU’s discursive
efforts to distance itself from past mistakes by placing greater emphasis on
local partnerships with ENP candidate countries, thus recognizing their speci-
ﬁcities (Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, and Popescu 2007), recent EU rec-
ommendations simply repeat stale prescriptions of economic liberalization
along standard, World Bank-derived neoclassical lines (European Commis-
sion 2011).
The argument that market-driven liberalization and economic growth
would lead to stability and democracy has been most recently problematized
by the Arab Spring uprisings. There is a risk, moreover, that sooner or later
DGMarket, Brussels,
December 2012.
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the social and economic concerns raised by the Arab Spring will vanish, and
Arab governments will return to the same neoliberal economic prescriptions
and programmes which have been agreed to by previous regimes. If this
were to occur, as seems likely with the post-Spring ascendancy of secular
and/or military-backed political forces in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt (Cambanis
2015; Filiu 2015; Worth 2016), the societal dynamics at play in the redeﬁni-
tion of Islamic economic development would become, once again, one of the
great “silent questions” (questions silencieuses) of the Arab world (Khatibi
1983, 18). The chance to think the Maghreb as an open horizon (“comme
horizon de pensée”) capable of an autonomous worlding (“qu’il puisse se
mondialiser pour son propre compte”), as a space of untameable difference
and plural thinking (pensée pluriel) will, once again, bide its time in the
desert (Meddeb 1977, 44–5).11 And for Europe, an opportunity for a truly
“worldly” engagement with this vital, crossroads region will, once again,
have been lost.
Vanishing point
Given the recent and profound changes in the Maghreb, it is worrying
that there has not been an accompanying shift in European foreign
policy. It is no longer sufﬁcient to admit previous errors and explain
the EU’s foreign policy failures in terms of security interests versus
values, internal divisions or incoherence. The mapping of external views
of the EU has showed how European foreign policy can have destabilizing
effects if local contexts are ignored and, more importantly, if the voices of
“others” are not heard. In the foregoing, we saw that there are different
manifestations towards socioeconomic development in the Maghreb: those
who would question the good intentions and sincerity of the EU; those
who would react in defensive ways by stressing independence, integrity
and domestic resources; and those mimicking western norms. All our
interviewees questioned the relevance of European experience for their
present and future prospects. Our ﬁndings call for a broadening of
western norms, which have been reduced to legalistic and formalistic cat-
egories with clearly separated public and private spheres, while excluding
religion from the public sphere. The EU’s incapacity or unwillingness to
reconcile these competing aspirations or hegemonic political projects has
proven to be problematic. It is in this context that the recognition of
difference becomes essential for the EU, together with the learning
process this will inevitably entail.
In order to address the deﬁciencies outlined in this essay, we call for a
decolonization of European foreign policy. Postcolonialism can help us to
11 As if heeding
Khatibi’s call to think
the Maghreb from its
multiplicitous
plurality, Rachid al-
Ghannouchi, founder
and chairman of
Tunisia’s Islamist
Party, Ennahda,
recently stated that
the solution for
Islamist movements
across the Maghreb/
Mashrek now was
not to enter armed
struggle, but to
further embrace
pluralism, tolerance
and compromise.
“The cure for a failed
democracy is more
democracy”, he
asserted, because
“dictatorship
disguised in religion is
the worst kind of
dictatorship” (cited in
Kirkpatrick 2014,
A1). On hearing these
words, we can
imagine Khatibi’s
Cheshire-cat smile.
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move beyond the limitations of Normative Power Europe in order to ident-
ify the tensions and contradictions that lie behind different manifestations
of “Europe” in its former colonial peripheries, as expressed in the
Maghreb today. Rather than root our conceptual frame in a Saidian intel-
lectual legacy that runs the risk of essentializing Europe/West and the
Orient, we draw instead on a critical, late twentieth-century theoretical
repertoire emerging from the heart of the Maghreb, exempliﬁed in the
work of Moroccan socialist/poet Abdelkébir Khatibi. Following in Khatibi’s
sandy footsteps, we attempt an updated double critique of European values
and Arab Islamic tenets through a pensée autre between both worlds, one
which seeks to destabilize metaphysical givens on either shore of the Med-
iterranean by revealing the extent to which both are dialectically enmeshed
as a dynamic, postcolonial horizon. Such a pensée autre, we argue, spatially
restages the Maghreb as a geo-philosophical site capable of autonomous
“worlding” from an “awakened margin”, a space of “untamed (or
savage) difference” that cannot be reterritorialized onto any ontological
foundations, either putatively “western/European” or “Islamic”. Thus,
rather than illuminate what the EU “is” or what it is “for”, thereby recen-
tring Europe as a primary analytical signiﬁer, it aims for a decolonized per-
spective, one which – from the very borders of Europe – produces an
orphan knowledge (savoir orpheline) that cannot be re-domesticated as a
form of Europe-centred desire and development (Khatibi 1977; Meddeb
1977).
This move has consequences not only for our critical understanding of
the EU’s foreign policy but also more importantly for those on its receiv-
ing end. For, as we have seen, the failure of the EU’s foreign policy
apparatus to engage with the masses of the Maghreb on issues of socio-
economic development; its lack of knowledge of Islamic principles and
traditions; and its incapacity to open communication channels with
Islamic groups reproduces internal splits within domestic societies of the
Neighbourhood, while undermining the legitimacy of its own foreign
policy agenda. In so doing, the EU may once again miss from view a
large segment of Moroccan and Tunisian societies unless its instruments
become inclusive of both secular and religious grassroots organizations
and social movements, which still remain off the radar of the European
decision-making apparatus. To avoid complicity in this vanishing point,
the decolonization of European foreign policy will require a form of
“desert thinking” whose intimate contours it will be the task of future
generations of border scholars jointly to explore, decipher and make
their own. This essay constitutes a modest impetus to that future-oriented
and worldly project.
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